Grand Strategy | Interests, not friendship, determine foreign policy (2024)

ByHappymon Jacob

When former Bangladesh Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina fled to India last week, there was a strong sentiment in India that India must stand by its friends. ‘Standing by our friends’ meant two things here: As a humanitarian gesture towards Hasina, and as an Indian intervention in Bangladesh to set things right. The humanitarian argument stressed the importance of helping a friendly leader by giving asylum. The interventionist argument claimed that India, as the region’s dominant power and an aspiring great power, must act when a key pro-India leader in the neighbourhood is ousted from power, as doing nothing would show India in poor light.

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The great power argument is delusional. We are simply past that age in our neighbourhood. The humanitarian argument, while sound, is not sufficient to deal with the Bangladesh problem, today and going forward. But the underlying assumption of both arguments — “We must help the India-friendly leader” — is problematic by itself. Thus, we must revisit some of our deeply-held assumptions about the utility of friendship and the friend vs foe binary in the conduct of foreign policy.

Adversarial states tend to hinder each other’s foreign policy pursuits because they primarily have clashing interests, not because they dislike each other. Sometimes adversaries cooperate, especially when they think doing so helps their interests. Friendly States assist each other in their foreign policy pursuits when they perceive mutual value in each other’s objectives. But even friends are unlikely to support each other if their interests clash. Cooperation among States is primarily a function of synergy in interest and not based on friendship or enmity. For sure, friendship does provide an environment of trust, but that alone is not enough for the pursuit of interests, as trust is also a function of common interests.

What forms friendship among States? Friendships are formed through common interests, threats, and priorities; however, friendship alone does not create common interests. Therefore, States that claim to be best friends with each other are primarily serving their national interests. For example, at the core, the United States (US) and India are not friends; they are States with overwhelming mutual interests. Japan and India work together because of common interests and threats, not just friendship.

There are inherent limits to the utility of friendship in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. For one, friendly countries don’t do things for each other sacrificing their interests. Second, if you identify certain political leaders in another country as friendly and others as unfriendly, the adversaries of your friends in that country might see you as unfriendly. Third, friendship can also become a liability. Sometimes, friends can pressurise you to do things that might not be in your national interest. Therefore, while friendship may be a virtue in domestic politics and social settings, it could become a liability in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

While having friendly countries, or friendly leaders in difficult countries, is useful, there is an inbuilt hierarchy that a State’s decision-makers must keep in mind — interest first, and friendship later. So, if the pursuit of interest requires a State to sacrifice friendships, it must do that. We must not forget what such friendships are for — to cater to our interests.

The transatlantic relationship, between the US and Europe, is often said to be one among friends — and yet, there too is an interests-driven relationship. The US needs Europe for the preservation of a US-led world order. Europe needs the US for security. They indeed share religious and cultural ties too. But, religious and cultural ties alone can’t guarantee strong partnerships; geopolitics in West Asia or our region would testify to that.

In the early 2000s, the US and India started negotiating to stabilise their bilateral relationship after a difficult period not because they wanted to be friends, but because each side had/has powerful interests in developing a strong strategic partnership. India and the US may call each other friends, as would Australia and India, but at the end of the day, these relationships are based on interests. The more powerful their mutual interests, the stronger friendships among States would be.

So, what should be India’s policy towards Bangladesh in the wake of Hasina’s ouster? First of all, India must clearly identify its interests as opposed to getting caught in a self-defeating friends vs enemies formulation. India’s interests vis-à-vis Bangladesh pertain to illegal immigration, safety of minorities in Bangladesh, security in states bordering the country, Indian businesses there, and the China factor. With these in mind, New Delhi should reach out to whoever is in power in Dhaka today and in future, and highlight how a stable relationship helps both sides. As a matter of fact, Bangladesh needs India more than India needs Bangladesh. Giving asylum to Hasina is a humanitarian gesture, but allowing the ousted PM to use India as a platform for political activity may hurt India’s interests vis-à-vis Bangladesh, for States take precedence over individuals in international relations.

This logic applies to India’s relationships with other states in the neighbourhood as well. This is not the age of regime change or interventions. So, focus on the pursuit of interests and not the cultivation of individuals because interests unlike friendships are transferable from one regime to another, and interests come with less baggage than friendships.

Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal